Early Warning Signals of Military Coups : A Case Study of Montenegro by Kraus Josef
ČLÁNEK/ARTICLE – EARLY WARNING SIGNALS OF MILITARY COUPS 
 
 
Received: 31. 3. 2020 Accepted: 9. 4. 2020 Published on-line: 15. 6. 2020 




EARLY WARNING SIGNALS OF MILITARY COUPS 
A Case Study of Montenegro 
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Josef Krausa 
Abstrakt 
Tento text je zaměřen na identifikaci základních signálů, které by mohly varovat před 
vojenským pučem. Jeho hlavním smyslem je na bázi teoretického rámce vojenských 
pučů vymezit faktory, které zvyšují pravděpodobnost blížícího se a proběhnuvšího 
vojenského převratu v zemi. Vytvořené schéma a seznam faktorů budou aplikovány 
v rámci jednopřípadové studie na nedávný pokus o puč v Černé Hoře. 
Abstract 
The following paper focuses on the identification of basic early warning signals 
of military coups. The primary purpose is to use a theoretical framework of coups and 
create a list of factors that increase the probability of upcoming or ongoing military 
coups. This list will be applied to a case study of Montenegro, which recently 
experienced an attempt of overthrowing its government. 
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Military coups are part of (not only) modern world politics and history. The role of an 
army in politics has been examined for decades. There are many concepts of armed 
forces being part of state governance of various kinds. Morris Janowitz1 identifies four 
different models of political-military elites – aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian, and 
garrison state. Apart from the model differences, military dictatorship can be prevented 
with proper settings of a democratic system observing, controlling and managing armed 
forces. The proper settings are the absolute and ideal point a democratic government 
can reach to fully control armed forces and prevent them from seizing power 
(or to interfere in state issues). In reality, many states have difficulties even to get 
closer to this highest standard, especially during the time of crisis or long-term 
problems of the state. Military coups or attempted military coups are still a highly 
topical issue of political and security research. The recent attempt in Montenegro has 
shown that armed forces are willing to seize power even in the European continent. 
This paper deals with the topic of modern military coups and attempts with the main 
goal to identify the indicators leading to the situation when armed forces are willing 
to take action against a civil government. Examination of the indicators causing a higher 
probability of the attempt of a military coup would lead to the creation of an early 
warning system (EWS). With such a system, scholars, state authorities and non-state 
organizations can have a chance to identify the upcoming threat of a military coup 
attempt. Indicators or the early warning signals based on the developed EWS are often 
used in the spheres of intelligence, predictive analysis or prevention. There are many 
layers or levels for examination and identification of proper indicators leading to the 
detailed observation of the chosen topic. Also, from the perspective of methodology, 
many different approaches can be used. Various tools provide different outcomes and 
can be used for different kinds of research and analysis. A brief description and division 
can be found in the previous work of the author.2 
First, the introduction to definitions of the military coup will be provided. After that, 
the analysis of different kind of typologies and definition attributes will follow with 
a special attention devoted to indicators signalizing an upcoming coup attempt. The 
background research of this topic is the relevant outcome of the following text with the 
final goal of creating a list of indicators to be used for the EWS formation. With such 
a framework, the paper continues to apply the EWS on the case of the coup attempt 
in Montenegro in 2016. The second half of the article has the form of a single case 
study, although with some limits based on the chosen case. The first limit is the coup 
did not happen after all; there was just a planned attempt exposed by the Montenegrin 
security forces. Second, there are many questions about the coup attempt. Some 
commentators and experts are even sceptical about the credibility of information 
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provided by the Montenegrin security forces. There are conspiracy theories suggesting 
there was no such a plan at all. Detailed information and relevant data are difficult 
to obtain in this case. However, it is still possible to use it for the environment analysis 
and EWS application. 
The data gathering for this article is focused on English written sources only. Although 
the author can read Serbian, Montenegrin and Russian sources, there is no need to use 
those. Official proclamations and data are available in English, which makes verification 
easier for the international audience. Other sources, such as books and expert articles 
used for the framework creation are also in English only. 
MILITARY COUPS AND REGIME CHANGES 
Military coups have always been an important cause of a political regime change. During 
the 20th century, we can examine dozens of military coups and multiple times more 
coup attempts not only in the “third world countries”, but also in Europe. That is why 
many scholars and experts have analysed military coups from the perspective of their 
goals, types, conditions, process or their chance to succeed. Many theories deal with 
the involvement of armed forces in politics, trying to classify and evaluate these efforts 
as goals and causes. Such causes increase the probability of a military coup and also 
constitute the basis for developing the EWS. 
Powel and Thyne3 define a coup d’état as an irregular transfer of the state’s chief 
executive, operated illegally by the military or other insider elites, which sometimes 
involves force or the threat of force, but need not involve casualties. Logically, the 
presence of armed forces is needed, if we speak about a military coup. Not only an 
army, but a wide range of armed forces can participate in a coup. According to Singh,4 
a coup attempt is defined as an explicit action, involving some portion of the state 
military, police, or security forces, undertaken with the intent to overthrow the 
government. Quite often, there is a combination of different kinds of armed forces 
participating in a coup attempt. 
On the other hand, the regime change takes place without the participation of masses, 
which distinguishes coups from revolutions. Galula, in his classical work,5 deals with the 
term “plot” as a synonym to a coup. A plot is a clandestine action of an insurgent group 
aiming to overthrow the top leadership in the respective country, it cannot and does not 
involve the masses, it is planned and prepared for a long time, but the action itself 
is brief and sudden. 
A regime change with the participation of a military is quite common. Armed forces are 
usually one of (or the only) actors able to perform a coup due to their capacity, 
hierarchic structure and tradition of obeying orders from above. But the fact a military 
is capable of committing a coup does not mean it chooses to do so. There have to be 
reasons for armed forces to intervene in politics this way. Many scholars work with the 
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motivation of a military to attempt a coup. The general view over this issue is that 
armed forces tend to venture into the political realm when their institutional interests 
are not being looked after or are jeopardized by the existing government.6 
The argument is based on the premise the lower the defence budget is, the likelier 
coups become, and coups are least likely in states with high military spending. Putschist 
armies are also more often than not involved in a violent conflict, and disagree with the 
civilian leadership over the strategic and tactical responses. It might also be connected 
to a self-perception of a military as a social class or its inclination to a social class. On 
this broader perspective, not only economic demands are relevant, but also values in 
general. Where the latter's values are not aligned with those of the regime, officers may 
feel compelled to act on behalf of their social class.7 
More than that, the preconditions and reasons for coups involve a combination 
of factors. Despite the military perspective, other theories explain the causes of a coup. 
Singh8 brings five different sets of hypotheses for testing – economic, regime, social, 
strategic and military. Economic perspective deals with the questions of whether poor 
countries are more likely to experience coups and if trade openness affects the 
probability of a coup attempt so as to prevent low or negative economic growth. The 
regime perspective deals with the questions whether it is less likely to do a coup in 
countries with high popular support for a government or whether the political system 
(democracy, non-democracy, military rule) and election time matter. The social 
approach focuses on a difference between ethnically divided societies and homogenous 
ones with regard to the coup probability. The strategic set of hypotheses deals with 
coups happening on the background of the Cold War, superpowers competition 
or alliances and foreign interference. Finally, the military approach deals with the 
importance of armed forces in society and its effect on the coup probability. 
The relevance of the military constituting a larger part of society or the relevance 
of military spendings or history of successful and unsuccessful coup attempts are 
examined. 
CAUSES OF MILITARY COUPS 
The above-mentioned pattern is more or less reflected by other scholars. Especially 
economic and social issues are often repeated. The main idea connecting both of them 
is based on low performance of a state, signalizing incompetence or corruption, which 
either precede coups or are later used to justify them. As O'Kane9 argues, the 
preconditions of coups are a combination of factors, mainly economic ones, such as 
instability of the local economy, discrediting the government, and dependence of the 
economy on exports, making it vulnerable to outside shocks. Poorer countries, logically, 
do not have enough resources to control these problems, and the government is blamed 
for it. Therefore, O’Kane emphasizes, coups are unlikely to occur in a recently 
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independent country until its new government has had the opportunity to demonstrate 
its inadequacy in dealing with the country’s economy. It simply takes time for 
a government to lose support and for an opportunity for a coup to occur. The relevance 
of economy on conflicts and security is something widely discussed by two authors Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler.10 Besides the famous greed and grievance theory, 
by examining coups in Africa, they identified the economic performance has an impact 
on potential plotters’ willingness and ability to organize a coup. A weak economy makes 
military officers less satisfied with the political representation and more favourably 
disposed toward a coup attempt. Also, the economic performance affects the chances 
for a coup to succeed with high popular support, if the economy is devasted. While the 
government loses legitimacy due to its poor economic performance, suffers from 
a political crisis and fails to establish constructive civil-military relations, it is easier for 
the military to topple it.11 Egil Fossum12 counted that almost 2/3 of all coups in Latin 
America took place at the time public disorders. The military tries to re-establish public 
order without further motives, or the disturbances may serve as a pretext to intervene 
when the real motives are completely different. 
Other highly discussed factors affecting the probability of a coup attempt are regime 
types and civil society. Sudduth13 summarizes that citizens in stable democratic 
societies want to protect their electoral systems and will not support coups. Losing the 
support and lowering the chance of a successful coup, potential plotters are less likely 
to attempt a coup in democratic societies. On the other hand, military regimes have 
a higher risk of coups than other types of regimes, because they lack legitimacy and 
popular support, plus they are more vulnerable to internal divisions. According to some 
studies, the type of political system is not an important factor; its strength is. Strong 
autocracies and strong democracies experience the least political instability. Weak 
states will see more coups, political participation reduces the likelihood of coups, 
autocracies decrease the opportunities to initiate a coup because of effective coup-
proofing strategies. But some studies show strong democracies significantly reduce the 
chance that a country will experience a coup. A full democracy is about 12 times less 
likely to see a coup d’état compared with a dictatorship.14 
The relation between the government and the military also matters from the 
perspective of interference in politics. Civilians increase the likelihood of a coup 
by politicizing the military. Any attempt to draw the armed forces into politics is a sign 
of weakness. Armed force in this matter can also play an important role in representing 
the will of the society and its values more than the government can. Military values such 
as discipline, bravery, obedience, honesty, and political impartiality are generally 
valued in society at large. Nationalism feeds this perception of a symbolic institution 
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often called the “cradle of the state”. Coups tend to take place in the context 
of a political crisis and when the armed forces believe they have a civilian mandate to 
resolve the turmoil.15 
Political crises as well as military coups are very often present before, during and after 
elections (in “democracy-like” systems). There is a strong concentration of coup 
attempts in election years, as proven by Egil Fossum.16 He argues coups would be 
executed whether elections were being held or not, but the timing is what matters. 
Coups during the election year might occur for supervising the election or securing the 
transfer of power. The motive to prevent the coming to power of groups inimical to the 
military seems to be much more important. It is more a pre-emptive pre-election 
action, rather than reaction. 
If a coup attempt happens, it raises the chance of another coup attempt in a non-
distant future. Some analysis emphasizes the role of coup history on the probability 
of other attempts in the future. Singh17 proved in his study that countries having recent 
successful coups were more likely to have a coup attempt in the following year(s). 
The same findings are provided by Bodea (et al.),18 who argues that a country that 
experienced a coup in the past five years has more than doubled its risk of seeing 
another coup in the current year. Sudduth19 evolves this argumentation by the inverse 
proportionality - the more time has passed since the last coup attempt, the less likely 
it is that the country will experience another one. 
The last but not least relevant factor affecting the probability of a coup attempt often 
mentioned in literature is the interference of foreign forces (armed or non-armed). 
Especially the presence of foreign troops, which, paradoxically, might have two 
different effects. On the one hand, it can be labelled as an important obstacle for 
a coup attempt. One of the most important strategies to prevent a coup or to neutralize 
the army in its effort to topple the government is to have foreign troops in the state’s 
territory. Foreign troops will be particularly unlikely to be sympathetic to a coup 
attempt. But on the other hand, foreign countries might encourage coups, rather than 
hinder them. O’Kane20 argues that if the existing host government starts implementing 
policies that are against the interests of the foreign power, then the foreign army will 
have reason to intervene. The intervention is not specified in details, but except for the 
presence of foreign troops, the activity of secret services (covert operations, 
intelligence, etc.) might have a significant impact on local politics and a coup attempt 
as well. 
INDICATORS AND EWS OF A MILITARY COUP 
From the factors and arguments mentioned above, it is clear that the development 
of an EWS and a set of indicators based on the quantitative approach and data is very 
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difficult or even impossible to achieve. There are some items to be followed, 
if a scholar, security institution or political sphere want to predict (and prevent) 
a military coup attempt. But still, it is very difficult to produce a list of indicators 
warning about the increasing probability of a military coup in the society. We are able 
to identify some dimensions to be followed and some phenomena to be watched, but 
not to make a list of indicators to be checked or not. 
The crucial issues for the motivation of the military endeavour to topple the current 
government seem to be its relation with armed forces, the strength of the government 
and civil society and the government’s legitimacy to rule, and the economic stability 
and performance of the country. These issues constitute the environment well-disposed 
or bad-disposed towards a coup attempt with dissatisfied society and the military. 
There are also secondary but still important issues such as regime type (connected to 
the factor of the government’s strength), presence or intervention of foreign military 
forces, elections or a recent history of a successful coup attempt. 
The strength of government (or governance) can be followed and evaluated by an 
external methodology of the state weakness and strength such as the Fragile State 
Index.21 If there is a noticeable and relevant regress in the statistics and database, 
it would be a clear sign of the state’s weakening. Special attention might be paid 
to the economic performance of the state. Even though it is reflected by the Fragile 
State Index as well, focusing on economic problems might predict the lowering of the 
government credibility and the trust of armed forces in proper state leadership 
or defence of their financial interests. That might lead to dissatisfaction of this 
important part of society, willing to intervene in its or society’s favour. A whole set 
of indicators of the state’s economic performance can be used as a part of the EWS, 
GDP growth, unemployment rate, inflation, interest rate, balance of trade, government 
debt to GDP, etc. If there is an evident and long-term tendency of worsening 
(or a sudden dramatic fall) of these indicators, it should be evaluated as a signal 
of the higher potential of a coup attempt. In general, coups have been connected 
to political instability, as well as disrupted effectiveness of governance and changing 
incentives of leaders.22  
Stable and strong civil society works as a prevention to coups, so where it is missing 
or disrupted, it can be considered a coup indicator. Another indicator related 
to governance and its resistance to coup attempts is the regime type. As we know, 
the probability of a coup is higher in the non-democratic regimes. So, the presence 
of a stable democracy can be perceived as prevention to coups, while the missing 
or weakening democracy is a warning signal. Logically, the presence of foreign military 
forces can affect a coup probability in two ways – to lower (prevent) it or to increase 
(cause or help) it. A history of a coup attempt in the last five years can play the role 
of a factor increasing the chance of another attempt. But just the record itself cannot 
be considered a signal of an upcoming coup d’etat. The same applies to elections. While 
it has been proved that during an election year the chances of a coup attempt are 
higher, this fact itself is not an indicator of an upcoming coup. It is more a factor 
affecting the pro-coup conditions rather than an indicator. But still, there is a reason 
to pay attention to elections taking part during the analysis of a coup probability. 
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COUP ATTEMPT IN MONTENEGRO 
A revealed coup d’état plot, planned and prepared in 2016, caused a significant 
earthquake in Montenegrin politics. On the background of the Montenegrin decision 
in December 2015 to join NATO and the Russian pressure to prevent it, Russia together 
with the local opposition and Serb ethno-nationalists coordinated an unsuccessful 
attempt to topple the democratically elected government of Montenegro in October 
2016. On the day of Montenegro’s 2016 parliamentary elections (held on 16th October), 
the police in Podgorica detained former Serbian gendarmerie commander Bratislav Dikić 
and 19 other individuals on charges of forming a criminal organization with the intent 
to overthrow the government. Russian agents, Serbian extremists, and leaders 
of the Montenegrin opposition alliance (Democratic Front) were prepared to overthrow 
the government on the election night. They planned to initiate political violence with 
the hope of triggering nationwide protests that would bring the Democratic Party 
of Socialists government to its end. According to officials, Serbian nationals initiated the 
enterprise in early 2016 under the direction of Russian GRU and FSB operatives.23 
This investigation theory was finally confirmed by a court verdict with two Russian 
intelligence officers and two opposition politicians among 13 people sentenced to jail 
in May 2019. The two Russian nationals were sentenced in absentia to prison for 15 and 
12 years, respectively. According to the court, the main aims of putschists were 
to topple the Montenegro’s government, to kill the prime minister and to bring a pro-
Russian alliance to power. The two leaders of the Democratic Front, an opposition 
alliance that wants to depose Djukanović and seeks closer ties with Serbia and Russia, 
received five-year jail terms each.24 
So, the coup attempt was unsuccessful and revealed before any action was taken. 
It would be a hypothetical question whether there was a chance for the coup to be 
successful or not. But the attempt itself is enough for the EWS testing. 
EWS AND THE MONTENEGRIN CASE 
If we look at the state and government strength in the case of Montenegro, according to 
the Fragile State Index, in 2016 the country was on the 131st place out of 178 countries 
(higher number means higher stability of the state). From the set of indicators collected 
into the final score, the worst rating is noticeable in the case of indicators called 
Fractionalized Elites, Group Grievance and External Intervention. According to the FSI 
methodology, the Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state 
institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinksmanship 
and gridlock between ruling elites. The use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling 
elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism is present.25 
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The main point of that in the case of Montenegro is the division of society (and politics) 
based on the national level, where almost one half of the population considered 
themselves being Montenegrins and roughly one third of the population identified 
themselves as Serbs.26 This is also reflected in different political orientation to the West 
or Serbia and the East in general of different parts of political representation of the 
country. Group Grievance is defined as divisions and schisms between different groups 
in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their 
role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group 
grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite 
injustices of the past.27 In the modern Montenegrin history, there are some crucial 
breakpoints causing group grievance and cleavages in the society - the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s, a referendum over the declaration 
of Montenegrin independence on Serbia (Yugoslavia, since 2003 Serbia and Montenegro) 
held in 2006, and political orientation of the government toward the West, with a view 
of joining NATO (2017) and EU in the future. Although it is difficult to define and 
identify it, there is an important group of Montenegrin citizens feeling grievance from 
these breakpoints that have brought their country to a state they are not comfortable 
with. The Montenegrin separation from Serbia was decided by 55 % of citizens voting 
for it while 45 % were against.28 A relevant part of Montenegrin society still keeps their 
Serbian identity and prefers the political orientation to Beograd or Moscow rather than 
Brussels. 
These two indicators are raising the chance of a coup attempt while providing the 
environment for possible popular support (if needed), the dissatisfaction of certain part 
of the state’s citizens with the government and weakening of the government’s 
legitimacy. The third indicator – External Intervention – is the indicator able to multiply 
the previous two. This indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in 
the – particularly security and economic – functioning of a state. On the one hand, 
the indicator focuses on security aspects of engagement by external actors, both covert 
and overt, in the internal affairs of a state at risk by governments, armies, intelligence 
services, identity groups, or other entities that may affect the balance of power 
(or a conflict resolution) within a state. On the other hand, External Intervention also 
focuses on economic engagement by outside actors, including multilateral 
organizations. In the case of Montenegro and the coup attempt, the court confirmed 
the direct involvement of foreign agents in the affair. The Russian influence in the 
Montenegrin politics and economy has been very strong for more than two decades. 
By using the Orthodox church, successfully shaping pan-Slavic attitudes and supporting 
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the pro-Russian political opposition, Kremlin raises the rating of the External 
Involvement indicator without its military presence in the territory.29 On the other 
hand, pan-Slavism is something tricky in the case of Montenegro. Some experts say it is 
more based on historical events and Montenegrin experience than emotional and 
irrational sympathy toward Russians and Slavs in general. Historically, Russia has played 
the role of the protector of the region from the Turks.30 Nowadays, the sympathy 
is based more on the Russian support of the Montenegrin economy by Russian 
investments. 
The regime type in the case of Montenegro can be a tricky thing concerning the political 
system and reality in the country. According to The Economist, the Democracy Index 
is (now and in 2016 as well) around the score 5.6, where 10 is the maximum 
of democracy and 1 is a pure authoritarian regime. According to this ranking, 
the Montenegrin system is somewhere in the middle, labelled as a hybrid regime; 
nor democracy, nor dictatorship.31 Therefore, in the Montenegrin case, it is impossible 
to strictly use the indicator, it is better to focus on governmental and civil society 
strength. 
Just like in the case of government, we can use an independent monitoring and ranking 
service to follow the civil society strength. The widely used Civil Society Index (CSI) 
developed by CIVICUS, a global alliance of civil society organizations and activists, can 
be very fruitful for it. The indexing system works with five levels of civil society in the 
countries. Montenegro has been receiving the score “Narrowed”, the second best from 
five.32 The organization defines the narrowed rating as a condition where a state allows 
individuals and civil society organizations to exercise their rights to freedom 
of association, peaceful assembly and expression. Still, violations of these rights also 
take place. Protests are conducted peacefully, although authorities sometimes deny 
permission, citing security concerns, and excessive force, which may include tear gas 
and rubber bullets, are sometimes used against peaceful demonstrators. The media 
is free to disseminate a wide range of information, although the state undermines 
complete press freedom either through strict regulation or by exerting political pressure 
on media owners.33 The real situation of Montenegro undoubtfully fits into this score 
definition. It means that the civil society in Montenegro is not as strong as it is in many 
European democracies, but it is still at a high level compared to the majority of the 
world. Therefore, the real strength is high, which limits the probability of coup 
attempts and chances of such efforts to succeed. 
Planning the coup on the eve of the elections confirms the election indicator warns us 
about a higher risk of a coup attempt during the election time. The effort to topple the 
government right at the time of the election in Montenegro is a perfect example of the 
relevance of this indicator. On the other hand, there had not been ant history of coup 
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attempts in the Montenegrin past. There is a question whether this attempt would 
affect the possibility of any other effort in the future – both ways. 
So, now we are getting to the economy as an essential factor of social satisfaction with 
the government’s performance. After the breakup of the Eastern bloc, the fall 
of communism and disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin economy had to 
transform to the market-oriented type. Like anywhere else, the economic 
transformation was painful for the local industry and old structures of the economy. 
It also helped financial sharks and organized crime structures to increase their power 
over the country. On the other hand, the economy of Montenegro has been in good 
shape for the last decade, mainly due to foreign investment and tourism. If we look at 
the data and the GDP per capita rating, the Montenegrin position in the chart is quite 
good compared to other countries of the region; better than Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo, but worse than Croatia.34 Thus, from 
the perspective of macro-economy, the Montenegrin position in the chart and economic 
performance is relatively good. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of economic freedom affecting any individual 
at the level of micro-economy, Montenegro is obtaining the 91st position out of 180 
(higher number means less freedom) according to the Economic Freedom Index.35 
This classification labels the Montenegrin economy as “Moderately Free” and puts 
the country below any other state of the region in the ranking. Heritage.org explains 
it by a very high level of corruption and nepotism within the system. Plus, Montenegro’s 
long-term political stability remains uncertain. Political tensions might be fuelled 
in part by the discontent with the corruption, weak rule of law, and limited media 
freedom. The same concerns hold back greater economic freedom.36 But the political 
system has been proving its high stability so far. Presence of Milo Dukanović 
in the positions of president or prime minister, leading and ruling the country, has been 
essential in this respect. With him holding the power, the semi-authoritarian regime 
in Montenegro is constant and changeless. But dissatisfaction with the state of economic 
freedom could raise the pressure on the government from the bottom, which might lead 
to a higher risk of a coup attempt. Although the macro-economic situation in the 
country is not that bad and should not motivate putschists to use it as the argument 
for legitimizing a coup, the environment of corruption and nepotism, limiting 
the economic freedom, causes dissatisfaction among the Montenegrins. This might be 
the indicator of a higher risk of a coup d’etat. 
The last but not least indicator is the relation between the government and the armed 
forces with a special attention to defence expenditure. There is a need to look at the 
government’s spending on the military over a broader period. Since 2010, there was 
a noticeable decrease in military spending from 72 million dollars to 56 million in 2013. 
2013 was the bottom in expenditure, but in 2014 and 2015, the amount of money 
flowing into the military raised very slowly to 59 million dollars each year. Since 2016, 
there has been a noticeable growth of expenses; 64 million in 2016, 65 million in 2017 
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and 77 million in 2018.37 The reason for the increase is evident, the upcoming 
NATO membership. Montenegro became the 29th full-fledged member of the alliance 
on 5th June 2017. Under NATO regulations, Montenegro is required to increase its 
defence spending to meet the 2 % target of the country’s GDP. The inherited excessive 
military infrastructure (the Ministry of Defence currently manages 256 military 
complexes – sites) and a high number of unpromising mobile assets require significant 
financial means and additional engagement of staff.38 
Thus, if we look at the issue from the perspective of a coup attempt indicators, 
the period from 2013 to 2015 might be seen a bit risky. But the rise of the government’s 
attention to the armed forces with the upcoming accession to NATO also meant 
the increase in military budget, modernization and recruitment. From this perspective, 
the armed forces should be satisfied, at least in matters of economy. The decision 
of entering NATO should ease the tension within military forces with the promise 
of upcoming development and expenditure raise. On the other hand, the part 
of the Montenegrin forces which represent the part of society oriented more toward 
Serbia and Russia rather than the West might be dissatisfied with the move. It might be 
the reason for a higher coup risk, but the satisfaction of the majority of the armed 
forces with the rise of investments seems to be the more decisive factor. Although 
the background and situation in 2013 to 2015 might be considered a positive indication 
of a higher probability of a coup attempt, the shift of government policy toward 
the armed forces may result in the exclusion of the examined indicator. 
CONCLUSION 
The EWS for a coup d’état can be a useful tool for observing and following 
the probability of a coup attempt in an examined country or territory. The set 
of indicators provided above can provide an overview of the situation that might tend 
to topple the government. The set can be used for a long-term situation monitoring and 
basic evaluation. Some indicators can be quantified due to indexing services such as the 
Fragile State Index, Economic Freedom Index, etc. Some indicators need a purely 
qualitative approach based on the knowledge and experience of the evaluator. 
The case study of the Montenegro coup attempt shows the indicator set can be used 
at three different levels: 1) the general EWS of a coup d’état to analyze the situation 
in and orientation of the society, politics and military that might tend to overthrow an 
ineffective government, 2) the estimation of success of a potential coup attempt, 
whether it is more likely to succeed or fail according to the examined conditions, 
3) the long term analysis of the development of indicators for coup prediction 
or prevention. 
The coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016 shows some indicators were positive during 
the period and confirms their presence could influence the probability of a coup 
attempt. The essential indicators seem to be the presence (and the involvement) 
of foreign security personnel, the period of parliamentary elections with the shift of the 
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government toward joining NATO. As supportive elements, we can mention the weaker 
civil society, lower governmental legitimacy due to the high level of corruption 
and nepotism, and limited economic freedom. The indicators of macro-economy, regime 
type and history of coup attempts were not confirmed in the case of Montenegro 
in 2016. Whereas the armed forces did not participate in the coup attempt and their 
position and financing were supposed to be improved on the background of the NATO 
joining process, we can exclude this indicator as well. The combination of confirming 
and excluding indicators shows that the situation and condition were sufficient 
for a coup attempt, but not for its success in toppling the government. 
There is another perspective to be mention at the end. As anywhere else in the Balkans, 
there are many unclear issues and theories about the reality of the coup attempt 
in 2016. Milo Djukanović is an authoritarian leader of the country and very soon after 
the announcement of suppressing the coup attempt, the discussion about 
the trustworthiness of the state declaration and trial have appeared. Some say it was 
just a manoeuvre of Djukanović to eliminate his political opponents and secure 
his winning in the elections.39 It is fair to point out this perspective as well, while it 
might affect the outcome of the article being based on an official version of the coup 
attempt story. 
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